





Induced Technological Change 
under Technology Competition 
 
Reyer Gerlagh  
  














Reyer Gerlagh, IVM, Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, 








This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/web/activ/_wp.html 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  
 







We develop a partial one-sector model with capital, natural resources, and labor as 
production factors, and endogenous technological change through research. Production 
exhibits increasing returns to scale. We compare the response of output and resource use 
to a change in resource prices with and without induced technological change (ITC). It 
is shown that induced technological change is insignificant in reducing resource use 
when there is one representative technology and output demand is inelastic to prices. In 
contrast, substantial gains from ITC appear when we allow for two competing 
technologies that can be employed for production, while these technologies are good 
substitutes. Also, in case of two technologies, conditions are specified under which 
multiple balanced growth paths exist, and it is shown that because of ITC, a temporary 
resource tax can lock out the economy from a resource intensive path and lock in to a 
resource extensive path. 
 
 
Keywords: Induced technological change, environmental taxes, partial equilibrium 
 
 
JEL: H23, O31, O41, Q42, Q43 
 
 
The author is grateful to David Popp, Chris Green, and Sjak Smulders for their 
suggestions and comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. The 
research has been funded by the Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO) under 
contract nr. 016.005.040. 
 
 
Address for correspondence:  
 
Reyer Gerlagh  
IVM/VU 
De Boelelaan 1087 
1081 HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
Phone: +31 - 20 - 44 49502 




Induced technological change under technology competition
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1.  Introduction
It has become increasingly clear that environmental taxes and regulation not only reduce pollution
by shifting behavior away from polluting activities, but also encourage the development of new
technologies that make pollution control less costly in the long run (Popp 2002). Understanding
the response of technology to economic incentives – dubbed induced innovation or induced
technological change (ITC) – will prove crucial for designing appropriate environmental policies.
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This paper studies the contribution of ITC to pollution reduction and it specifically addresses the
issue in the context of multiple competing technologies that are good substitutes for producing the
same good. The analysis extends the literature that has mainly studied ITC in the context of one
representative aggregate technology.
Since Grossman and Krueger (1993), the effect of environmental taxes and regulation on
pollution is commonly decomposed in a scale effect, a composition effect, and a factor
substitution effect, where the latter effect is often referred to as the technology effect.
3 The scale
effect signifies the increase or decrease in aggregate output and pollution, all other things equal.
The composition effect records the shift away from polluting activities. The factor substitution
effect measures the implication on pollution of the substitution of less polluting production factors
for more polluting production factors. A similar breakdown into a composition and factor
substitution effect can be made for ITC. First, when multiple technologies are available that can
be employed for the production of a good, each technology with a different resource use and
pollution profile, then environmental taxes will induce a change in technological composition, that
is a shift towards technologies that are less polluting. Second, treating technology as a production
factor, ITC stands for a substitution of technology for other production factors. Most of the
                                                  
1 The author acknowledges financial support by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO)
under contract number 016.005.040.
2 For an extensive literature overview of policy instruments in relation to ITC, see Jaffe et al. (2002).
3 The reason for our change in labeling is that, in this paper, we want to separate factor substitution from a
technology effect.ITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
literature on ITC is based on the concept of a representative technology and focuses on ITC as
enhanced factor substitution (e.g. Newell, Jaffe and Stavins 1999, Goulder and Matthai 2000).
ITC is receiving much attention, for example in the climate change related literature where its
potential contribution to policies aiming at greenhouse gas emission reductions is subject of a yet
undecided debate. A few studies try to estimate empirically the impact of enhanced factor
substitution through ITC relative to the direct factor substitution effects (Goulder and Schneider
1999, Nordhaus 2002). They conclude that, though ITC is not negligible, its contribution to
emission abatement is small when compared to the contribution of direct factor substitution.
Nordhaus’ (2002) conclusion is, however, based on an assumed representative technology, and it
neglects induced changes in the technological composition as a channel through which ITC
operates. The reduction of resource use will not only require the substitution of knowledge for a
resource, it will also require the substitution of ‘clean’ technologies for ‘dirty’ technologies.
Goulder and Schneider model two energy sources but treat these as complements (elasticity of
substitution below unity), so that substitution and competition between energy sources is limited.
Technology competition is of specific interest for climate change in relation to energy use and
supply. In the long term, energy savings will be insufficient for substantial abatement levels of
carbon dioxide emissions, since energy is an essential production factor. Instead, if a substantial
emission abatement strategy is aimed for, a shift away from fossil-fuel based energy sources
towards carbon-free energy sources will have to carry such a strategy (Chakravorty et al. 1997).
For this reason, we have to take into account the effect of ITC on the relative contribution of
various technologies used for production (Weyant and Olavson 1999).
The effect of ITC on the technological composition has fundamentally different features
when compared to the enhanced factor substitution effect of ITC. Even though ITC amplifies
factor substitution, factor substitution remains a continuous process. For multiple technologies,
we can expect discontinuous responses to environmental taxes, since under endogenous
innovation, production exhibits increasing returns to scale, and profit maximization or cost
minimization implies a non-continuous adjustment of production to price changes. Specifically, in
this paper, we make a case for the existence of so-called bifurcation equilibria. An environmental
tax can, when it passes a certain threshold, cause a trade in places between a currently dominantREYER GERLAGH
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and polluting technology, and a currently minor but non-polluting technology. An analysis based
on a representative technology cannot represent this behavior.
4
In this paper, we develop a one-sector two-technology model with endogenous R&D in the
tradition of the endogenous growth models with natural resources that have been specified to
study growth and sustainability (Gradus and Smulders 1993; Bovenberg and Smulders 1995; den
Butter and Hofkes 1995; Bovenberg and Smulders 1996; Smulders 1999). Section 2 describes the
basic features of the model for one sector and one technology. Section 3 studies the dynamic paths
and steady states, and it examines the returns to scale. An important finding of this section is that
returns to scale increase when output levels increase. A matured technology has higher increasing
returns vis-à-vis an infant technology. ITC enters the analysis in Section 4, where the model is
used to examine the effect of ITC on the elasticity of output and resource use, with respect to
resource prices. Section 5 extends the model to take account of two competing technologies. That
is, two different technologies are considered that can be used to produce goods that are good
substitutes. In this setting, increasing returns to scale typically produce a one-takes-all allocation,
that is a corner solution where one technology dominates and the other technology disappears. In
contrast, the increasingness of returns we have found in Section 4 permits the existence of
multiple interior solutions. We specify explicit conditions for existence of stable and unstable
equilibria. Section 6 examines the effect of ITC on the elasticity of output and resource use, with
respect to resource prices, in the two-technology model. ITC is shown to act as a strong multiplier
for the elasticities. This section also shows that a resource tax can, through ITC, lock out
production from a locally stable steady state in which a resource intensive technology dominates,
to an alternative stable steady state in which a resource extensive technology dominates. Finally,
Section 7 discusses the implications of our analysis for climate change policies.
2.  Model set up for one technology
This section presents the basic elements of our model for production and innovation, describing
one sector and one technology. We distinguish between ‘research firms’ that produce innovations
and producers of the final sector good. Technology is described as an expanding library of ideas
that can be used in the production process. Innovation is a cumulative process; each innovation
                                                  
4 More in general, a representative aggregate technology does not perform well when there are increasing returns
to scale at the disaggregate level (Basu and Fernald 1997).ITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
builds on the stock of existing knowledge. Producers of the final good can make use of all past
and present innovations, that is the total stock of knowledge, and pay a license fee to all research
firms that have developed the innovations that are currently in use. In turn, the researchers receive
the license fees from all present and future final goods producers that use their innovations. Both
researchers and producers of final goods take prices as given. We do not consider product variety
and price setting under monopolistic competition as in many other endogenous growth models
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995 for an overview).
Demand for the sector good is assumed to show constant elasticity of substitution σ,
yt = ŷt pt
–σ, (1)
for some exogenous demand variable ŷt, where pt is the price of the sectoral final good. The final






where kj,t, is the capital stock, ej,t is resource use, and lj,t, is labor use in efficient labor units.
Human capital increasing labor productivity is not specified explicitly, as it is considered
embodied in the labor good, exogenous to the individual firm. The technology variable aj,t
denotes the number of innovations that are employed by the j-th firm, at date t.
Capital depreciates over time at rate δ, and is accumulated through investments it,
t j t j t j k i k , , , δ − = & .( 3 )
In addition to the investment expenditures, ij,t, resource rents qtet, and wages, wtlj,t, firms have
to pay a license fee for the innovations employed, denoted by θt, for every unit of innovation aj,t,
and for every unit of output yj,t. At time t, total expenditures thus amount to ij,t + qtej,t + wtlj,t
+ θtaj,tyj,t, while revenues amount to ptyj,t. The firms maximize the net present value of their cash
flows:
max  t i l w e q y a p e t j t j t t j t t j t j t t j
t d ) ) ((
0
, , , , , , ∫ − − − θ −
∞
ρ − ,( 4 )
subject to (2) and (3), where ρ is the interest rate. Since expenditures on licenses are proportional
to output, production has constant returns to scale, and the firms can operate in a competitive
market with marginal pricing. We thus omit firms’ subscripts j. The Hamiltonian for profit
maximization reads:REYER GERLAGH
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(1–α–β) – y) + ψ (i – δk). (5)
For convenience, we omitted time subscripts. The first order conditions for y, a, l, e, i, and k are,
respectively,
p = θa + λ,  (6)
θy = ηλy/a,( 7 )
w = (1–α–β)λ y/l ,  (8)
q = β λ y/e ,  (9)
 1 = ψ ,  (10)
ψ & = ρψ–Hk = (ρ+δk)ψ – αλy/k, (11)
We can substitute equations (10) in (11) to derive a capital cost equation that shows capital costs
to consist of interest and depreciation:
ρ + δk = αλy/k . (12)
The price of the output good, p, consists of two parts (6), the license fee θa and the immediate
production costs λ. From (6) and (7), we see that innovation costs make a constant mark up η on
top of the immediate production costs net of the license fee, λ,
p = (1+η) λ . (13)
Furthermore, because of linear homogeneity of production y in (k,e,l), we can calculate λ, as
dependent on capital costs, ρ+δk, the resource price q, and wages, wt,




1–α–β } = ξ a
–η , (14)








is exogenous to the sector. The license fee θ is now calculated as
θ = η ξ a
–1–η, (16)
and output prices are given by
p = (1+η) ξ a
–η . (17)ITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
Next we turn to the supply of innovations. There are two externalities working in opposite
direction. As a positive externality, knowledge about past innovations is public, that is,
technology is non-rival when it is used to produce new technology. As a negative externality,
research efforts r by one firm negatively affect the finding of new innovations by other firms,
because of fishing out of new innovations that are attainable from the current state of technology.
Research firms use the ‘library’ of past inventions to produce new innovations. We distinguish
between the overall (non sector-specific) state of technology, denoted by upper-case A, and the
sector specific technological state of the art, denoted by lower-case a. The distinction is a way of
representing the finding by Jaffe (1986) that spill-over effects between ‘technological neighbors’
exceed spill-over effects between distant technologies. In our model, technological innovation
within the sector spills over through a, whereas we abstract from spillovers between sectors. The
next section studies the implications of this distinction for the returns to scale.
A research firm j can produce a number of new innovations daj according to
daj = ζ r
π–1 (a+A)
1–π drj. (18)
where ζ is a scaling constant, drj denotes the research expenditures by firm i (drj=rjdt, research
expenditures are equal to the research flow rj times the time interval dt), and r denotes the overall
expenditures on research by all (other) research firms. Aggregation of innovations (18) over the
research firms gives
a & = ζ r
π (a+A)
1–π . (19)
Equilibrium on the market for innovations requires that the costs of developing a new technology,
that is, the costs of an increase dai, equals the revenues the research firm can obtain by selling the





The revenues from an innovation are equal to the net present value of future license fees:
τ ∫θ = ϕ
∞





t e y , (21)
where φt denotes the asset price of an innovation. In terms of a differential equation, we write
ϕ &  = ρφ – θy = ρφ – η ξ y a
–1–η . (22)REYER GERLAGH
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Substitution of the demand function (1) and the price-technology relation (17) gives








a & = ζ
1/(1–π) φ
π/(1–π) (a+A). (25)
The two equations (23) and (25) fully describe the dynamics for technology a and its price φ. We
use these in the next section to study existence, stability, and returns-to-scale properties of the
steady state.
3.  Steady state and returns to scale
In this section, we establish conditions for a stable balanced growth, also labeled a steady state
solution, for the dynamic equations (23) and (25), and we analyze the returns to scale, that is, the
decrease in production costs that occurs when the output level, y, increases. Along the balanced
growth path, the rate of increase for the general purpose technology A is a constant gA, wages
increase at constant rate gw, resource prices increase at constant rate gq, and the exogenous
demand ŷ increases at constant rate gŷ. Furthermore, we characterize the balanced growth path by
a constant ratio between the sector specific technology and the general purpose technology, a/A
and denote the growth rate of both technology variables by the constant γ=ga=gA. It follows from
the innovation dynamics (19) that research expenditures grow at the same rate, gr=γ, and from
(24) that the technology price φ is constant, gφ=0. In turn, the price dynamics equation (23)
makes clear that the growth rates for wages, resource prices and demand ŷ are linked such that the
exogenous variable




is a constant. We can thus express the growth rates of ξ, p, and y in terms of γ and gŷ: gξ=((1+η–
ση)γ–gŷ)/(1–σ),  gp=(γ–gŷ)/(1–σ),  gy=(gŷ–σγ)/(1–σ). These growth rates are used in
Figure 2 to normalize over time the axes. We notice that, if demand growth in proportion toITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
technology, gŷ=γ, and factor costs increase by gξ=ηγ, then prices remain constant, gp=0, and
output grows at the same rate as demand, gy=γ.
First, we study the existence of a steady state and its stability through the phase diagrams for
(a,φ), as in Figure 1a, b, and c. The two loci with ϕ & =0 and a & =γa, are given by (23) and (25), that






π/(1–π) / (γ – ζ
1/(1–π) φ
π/(1–π)), (28)
respectively. We show three figures. For σ<1+1/η, the ϕ & =0 locus is downwards sloping whereas
the  a & =γa locus is upwards sloping, as in Figure 1a. There is a unique stable steady state. For
larger values of the elasticity of demand, σ>1+1/η, existence and stability of the steady state
depends on the value of the constant χ, and for given resource price and wages this means that
existence and stability depend on the market size ŷ. For 1+1/η<σ<1+1/η+(1–π)/πη, and small ŷ, a
stable steady state exists as in Figure 1b. But if the size of the market increases, the ϕ & =0 locus
shifts upwards and the steady state vanishes, as in Figure 1c. We can extend the list of figures for
higher values of σ, but we constrain ourselves to this set of figures since these will turn out to be
of most interest for our further analysis. It is remarkable that an increase of ŷ transforms Figure 1b
with stable steady state into Figure 1c that has no steady state. An analysis of the returns to scale
in steady state will reveal the mechanism at play, and will prove useful for the two-technology













FIGURE 1a. Phase diagram for
(a,φ); saddle-point stability for
0≤σ<1+1/η
FIGURE 1b. Phase diagram for
(a,φ); saddle-point stability for
1+1/η<σ<1+1/η+(1–π)/πη,




small ŷ large ŷ
We will measure the rate of return through the decrease in prices as a function of the output level,
ω(y)=–(dp/dy)/(y/p).
5 For convenience, we use the symbol ε to denote relative growth rates,
εp=dp/p,  εy=dy/y, and we use double subscripts to denote elasticities, εpy=εp/εy=–ω(y).
Notice that we measure the scale effect with respect to actual output y; we study returns to scale in
supply and abstract from the demand equation (1), and from the variable ŷ. To sketch the
significance of returns to scale in production for the existence and stability of a steady state, first
consider a simple economy of constant returns to scale, ω(y)≡0. Production prices are independent
of the output level and a stable steady state exists where supply meets demand. In an economy
with increasing returns to scale, i.e. ω>0 and constant, a stable steady state exists as long as
demand is inelastic or increasing returns are not too large, σω<1. On the other hand, if demand is
highly elastic, or if increasing returns to scale are sufficiently large, that is if σω>1, an unstable
steady state arises. As we will show, in our economy, the returns to scale vary with the output
level; the condition for a stable steady state σω(y)<1 can thus hold for small output levels y, while
it does not hold for large output levels y.
Recall from (17) that prices p are proportional to a
–η, and thus
ω(y) = –εpy = η εay. (29)






1/π ξ y. (30)
On the balanced growth path and for a given point in time, we may consider A and ξ fixed so that
we can study the relation between y and a. Both sides of the equation are monotonically
increasing in a and y, respectively, and if y→0, then a→0, and if y→∞, then a→∞. Thus, εay>0,
and production has increasing returns to scale. For low values of demand y, the sector specific
technology is substantially below the general purpose technology spillover, a<<A, and we have
that
                                                  
5 The value of 1+ω(y) is often labeled the scale factor. The value of ω(y) is also known as Verdoorn’s coefficient
(cf. Jefferson 1988, Harris and Lau 1998).ITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
εay = 1/(1+η+(1–π)/π)
 , (31)
so that (for y small),
limy→0 ω(y) = –εpy = η/(1+η+(1–π)/π)
 . (32)




limy→∞ ω(y) = –εpy = η/(1+η)
 . (34)
The economy does not only exhibit increasing returns to scale, ω(y)>0, but remarkably, the
returns to scale accelerate when output levels increase, ω′(y)>0. This finding is consistent with the
empirical literature (Caballero and Lyons 1992; Basu and Fernald 1997).
6
The feature of ω(y) enables us to appreciate the phase diagrams of Figure 1. First, let us
consider the case in which demand is relatively inelastic, σ<1+1/η. For all output levels,
σω(y)<1, and though the supply curves is downward sloping because of increasing returns to
scale, still, the demand curve crosses the supply curve from above and there exists a stable steady
state, as in Figure 2a. For σ>1+1/η+(1–π)/πη, not represented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, we have
that σω(y)>1 for all y, and supply will cross demand from above, signifying an unstable steady
state. For 1+1/η<σ<1+1/η+(1–π)/πη, we have that σω(0)<1<σω(∞). For low values of the size
of the market, ŷ, demand crosses supply two times, and a stable and unstable steady state exists
(Figure 2b). For ŷ large, the demand curve shifts to the right and no steady state exists (Figure 2c).
                                                  
6 Basu and Fernald (1997) find a substantial gap between the estimated rate of return on the disaggregate level
and the aggregate level of production. They also show that the gap decreases if they correct their estimates for
factor reallocation between sectors. From this, they conclude that the returns on aggregate level are insufficient
to warrant the use of analytical models that require substantial increasing returns for providing specific results.
We stress that the results of our analysis do not require substantial increasing returns. A small gap between




































FIGURE 2a. Demand (D) and
Supply (S); 0≤σ<1+1/η
FIGURE 2b. Demand (D) and
Supply (S); 1+1/η<σ<1+1/η+(1–
π)/πη, small ŷ
FIGURE 2c. Demand (D) and
Supply (S); 1+1/η<σ<1+1/η+(1–
π)/πη, large ŷ
4.  Resource price elasticities
In this section, we study the response of output, technology, and resource use on a permanent
shock in the resource price. The production factors will substitute, and technology will adapt to
the change in factor prices. We can think of a resource tax that increases the resource price, and
this section deals with the implications of ITC for the effectiveness of such a tax. In precise terms,
we calculate the resource price elasticities for output, technology and resource use, distinguishing
the direct factor substitution effect from ITC effects. More or less, in the short term, technology
does not adjust and direct factor substitution is most important. In the long term, induced
technological change will play a role.
An increase in the resource price q implies an increase in the unit production cost for the
capital-labor-resource composite ξ by (15):
εξq = β. (35)
In the short term, technology does not adjust, εa=0, and output prices go up by the same rate as the
composite input (17):
εpq = εξq = β. (36)
Consequently, output falls (1),
εyq = –σεpq = –βσ, (37)ITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
and since resource expenditures have a fixed share in output value, β/(1+η), resource use adjusts
according to
εeq = εyq + εpq – 1 = –βσ–(1–β), (38)
where the first part, εyq=–βσ, accounts for the decrease in output demand; this signifies the
composition effect when seen from the overall macro-economic perspective. The second part,
εpq–1=β–1, accounts for factor substitution.
In the long term, technology adjusts and changes in output prices p consist of one part
reflecting the immediate production costs increase and another part reflecting the change in
technology (17). Equation (36) becomes:
εpq = εξq – η εaq . (39)
Technology adjusts because of two opposite forces (30). An increase in production costs ξ makes
innovations more profitable, and thus, innovations increase, partly offsetting the resource tax. At
the same time, a decrease in output level y decreases the value of innovations, and thus, decreases
the innovation level. We have
7
εaq = (ω(y)/η)(εyq + εξq). (40)
Substitution of (39) and (40) in (37) gives:
εyξ = –σ(1–ω(y))/(1–σω(y)), (41)
and in turn,
εyq = εyξ εξq = –βσ(1–ω(y))/(1–σω(y)). (42)
The short-term elasticity of output with respect to resource prices, εyq = –βσ (37), is multiplied
by the factor (1–ω(y))/(1–σω(y)) to reach the long-term elasticity. For inelastic demand, σ<1,
an increase in innovations partly compensates for the increase in production costs ξ, εaq>0. After
an initial fall in output, following a price increase for the resource, due to ITC in the long term,
                                                  
7 Notice that the elasticity of the left-hand-side of equation (30) with respect to a is ω(y)/η; see also the
derivation of ω(y) in (32) and (34).REYER GERLAGH
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production levels partly recover. For elastic demand, σ>1, the decrease in output reduces the value
of innovations so much that research activities decrease, εaq<0, and due to ITC in the long term,
production levels continue to fall. In the intermediate case, σ=1, the two forces of (40) balance
and technology is unaffected by resource prices, εaq=0.
Under ITC, resource use adjusts according to (38), (41), and εpq= –(1/σ)εyq:
εeq = εyq + εpq – 1 = (1–σ)β(1–ω(y))/(1–σω(y)) – 1. (43)
The short-term (38) and long-term (43) elasticity of resource use coincide for σ=1, since then, the
level of technology is unaffected by resource prices. For inelastic demand, σ<1, ITC enables a
recovering output level in the long term, while further reducing resource use, that is innovation is
an effective substitute for the resource. For elastic demand, σ>1, ITC increases the resource
intensity of production and it reduces resource use mainly through an enhanced decrease in output
levels.
To assess the significance of ITC relative to factor substitution without ITC, we compare the
elasticities of output and resource use with and without ITC, using some basic numbers that give
an impression of climate change policy analyses insofar considering energy savings. We treat
primary energy, such as oil, as the resource e, available at the cost of 2.5 $/GJ (IEA/OECD, 1999,
p.41), and with an average carbon content of about 0.025 gC/kJ. A carbon tax of 25 $/tC will
increase primary energy prices by 25%. Primary energy is used to produce end-use energy (e.g.
heating), where primary energy sources have a cost share of say 50 per cent, β=0.5. We notice
that the value of β has no bearing on the relative effect of ITC. Furthermore, we assume that
energy is essential for production, and demand has a low elasticity of 0.4 (Manne et al. 1995).
Finally, we assume moderate increasing returns for the energy sector of 20 per cent, ω=0.2.
8 The
calculated elasticities are reported in Table  1. The elasticity of end-use energy without ITC
amounts to –0.20. The elasticity of primary energy use without ITC is –0.70. The elasticity of
end-use energy with ITC is –0.17. The elasticity of primary energy use with ITC is –0.74. A
carbon tax of 25 $/tC decreases primary energy use by 16.1 %, without ITC, and by 16.9 %, with
                                                  
8 For the illustrative calculations, increasingness of ω(y) is inconsequential.ITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
ITC.
9 In this example, the effect of ITC on primary energy use is insignificant. This confirms the
result by Nordhaus (2002) who also found ITC to be less effective then direct factor substitution.
Table 1. Calculated elasticities with respect to the resource price*
One technology Two technologies
Without ITC With ITC Without ITC With ITC
Output –0.20 –0.17 –0.28 –0.70
Resource use –0.70 –0.74 –0.78 –1.50
* Calculations based on: β=0.5, ω=0.2, σ=0.4 (one technology, using equations (37), (38), (42), and (43)), σ=3,
y1/y2=9 (two technologies, using equations (56), (57), (59), and (60))
Yet, if we assume that carbon-rich energy sources compete with carbon-poor or carbon-free
energy sources, a different context arises, and as we will show analytically in Section 6, and as
presented numerically in Table 1, the contribution of ITC increases considerably. In the context of
competing technologies, demand for output produced with a specific technology is not determined
by demand elasticities for total output, e.g. by energy requirements for production. Instead,
demand is determined by competition between goods produced with different technologies, and
we expect a higher elasticity of demand for technology specific output. Moreover, in the energy
context, the competing carbon-poor or carbon-free energy sources will also benefit from
increasing returns to scale through ITC when they gain market share. This brings us to the next
section, where we study the joint innovation efforts for competing technologies.
5.  Competing technologies
So far we did not explicitly consider competition between technologies. In this section, we extend
the one-technology model assuming two competing technologies that can be used for production.
Goods produced by both technologies have their own characteristics but are substitutes; we use
the same elasticity of substitution σ as above, now to denote the constant elasticity of substitution
between technologies. For convenience, we assume inelastic demand on the aggregate level,  t y ,
                                                  
9 Notice that we take the exponential function of the elasticity multiplied by the relative price increase of 25%: –
0.161=1–exp(–0.7x0.25), and –0.169=1–exp(–0.74x0.25).REYER GERLAGH
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that grows at a constant rate γ, so that we can focus on the substitution effects between the two
technologies. The technologies are denoted by g=1,2. Output aggregation satisfies
t t t y y y = +
− σ σ σ − σ σ − σ ) 1 /( / ) 1 (
, 2
/ ) 1 (
, 1 ) ( . (44)
We can think of various energy sources, such as oil, gas, and renewable energy systems, operating
on the energy market. In a classic economy of constant returns to scale, each technology has a
‘natural’ share of the market, inversely proportional to the production costs associated with that
technology. In an economy with increasing returns to scale, but with a constant scale factor, 1+ω,
both technologies would share the market if both technologies are poor substitutes, or if the scale
factor is not too large, σω<1. On the other hand, if both technologies are good substitutes, or if
there are substantial increasing returns to scale, σω>1, full specialization would occur. In our
economy, the returns to scale increase with the output level, and thus, it may be that σω(0)<1,
while σω(y)>1 for larger values of output y. The increasingness of ω(y) can produce a partial
pattern of specialization.
In this section, we will assume that both technologies have the same production costs net of
technology, ξ1=ξ2. The states of technology ag determine the prices pg (17), which determine the
output levels yg (45), which drive the price dynamics for technology, ϕ &  (22). Simultaneously,
innovation prices drive the technology dynamics (25), and this defines a four-dimensional
dynamic system for (a1,a2,φ1,φ2). The direct analysis thereof is beyond our capabilities. Instead,
we consider steady states and we study an auxiliary mapping Λ:[0,1]→[0,1] that measures the
feed back of output levels on demand. To specify the mapping Λ(.), we use the variable xg for
demand, and yg for output levels. The economy is in equilibrium if xg=yg. For xg and yg, the same
aggregation equation (44) applies. Furthermore, let the variable sy be the share of technology 1 in
total output, sy=y1/(y1+y2), 0≤sy≤1, and similarly, sx is the share of technology 1 in total
demand,  sx=x1/(x1+x2), 0≤sx≤1. From sy, we can derive the output levels (y1,y2), based on
(44), and in turn the steady state technology levels (a1,a2) and prices (p1,p2), based on (30) and
(17), respectively. Now, prices determine the share of the first sector in total demand, sx, through
 x1/x2 = (p1/p2)
–σ , (45)
jointly with (44). The chain sy→(y1,y2)→(a1,a2)→(p1,p2)→sx defines the mapping Λ:sy→sx.
A fixed point sx=sy=s*; Λ(s*)=s* indicates a steady state solution. There are three obvious
fixed points. Λ(0)=0, since for sy=0, we have y1=0 so that a1=0, p1=∞, and in turn x1=0.
Similarly, Λ(1)=1. For sy=½, we have y1=y2 so that a1=a2, p1=p2, and in turn x1=x2. Thus,ITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
Λ(½)=½, as well. The slope of Λ(.) around a fixed point tells us whether the steady state is stable,
or unstable. If Λ'(s*)>1, as in point C in Figure 3b and Figure 3c, then the balanced growth path C
is unstable. An increase in the production share for technology 1, relative to the balanced growth
path, will decrease production costs by so much that the increase in demand for goods produced
with technology 1 exceeds the increase in production. The increase in demand further stimulates
decreasing production costs, and production will converge to the stable balanced growth path D or
E, for Figure 3b and Figure 3c, respectively. If Λ'(s*)<1, as in point C in Figure 3a, then the
balanced growth path C is stable. In this section, we show that Figure 3a, Figure 3b, and Figure 3c
cover all possible configurations, dependent on the value of σ  vis-à-vis the elasticity of
productivity ω(0) and ω(½ y ).
On a fixed point of Λ(.), we have x1=y1, and x2=y2, and Λ'(.)>1 is equivalent with
dx1/dy1>1, or εx1y1>1. The elasticity of x1 relative to y1 we study here. From the CES
aggregation (44) we have
εy1 = –(y2/y1)
(σ–1)/σ εy2 . (46)
We first study the value of εx1y1 around sy=0, that is for small values of sy, so that y1<<y2. We can
take εy2=0 (46), and focus on output and demand changes for the first technology, εy1 and εx1. By
definition of ω(.), prices satisfy
εp1y1 = –ω(0)    (47)
whereas εp 2=0. At the same time, demand satisfies
εx1p1 = –σ    (48)
so that
εx1y1= εx1p1 εp1y1 = σω(0) (49)
The slope of Λ(.) satisfies Λ'(0)>1 if σω(0)>1, as in Figure 3a and Figure 3b. In contrast, if
σρ(0)<1, Λ'(0)<1 and demand will fall short of supply for low levels of y1, as in Figure 3c.
Now consider the steady state with y=y1=y2=(½)
σ/(σ–1) y , and sy=sx=½. Then, from (46),
we have that εy1y2=–1, and εx1x2=–1. Analogous to the analysis for sy→0, above, we deduct
εp1y1 = –ω(y) ; εp2y2 = ω(y). (50)REYER GERLAGH
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At the same time, demand satisfies
εx1p1 = –½σ ; εx1p2 = ½σ , (51)
so that
εx1y1= εx1p1 εp1y1 + εx1p2 εp2y2 εy2y1 = σω(y) . (52)
The slope of Λ(.) satisfies Λ'(½)>1 if σω((½)
σ/(σ–1) y )>1, as in Figure 3b and Figure 3c. In
contrast, if σω((½)
σ/(σ–1) y )<1, Λ'(½)<1 and demand will fall short of supply for decreasing
levels of y1, as in Figure 3a.
We can now distinguish three cases. First, if σω((½)
σ/(σ–1) y )<1, then also σω(0)<1 and
the graph of Λ(.) will look as in Figure  3a. The goods are too poor substitutes, or even
complements if σ<1, and no specialization will take place. There is one stable balanced growth
path in which both technologies produce half of total output, C , and there are two unstable
extreme balanced growth paths A and E. If σω(0)<1<σω((½)
σ/(σ–1) y ), Figure 3b applies. The
increasing returns to scale in production, jointly with the good substitutability between the two
technologies, make an equal partition of production over both sectors C unstable. However,
returns to scale are also insufficient to warrant an extreme specialization; A and E are unstable as
well. There must be two symmetric stable balanced growth paths of partial specialization, B and
D. If 1<σρ(0)<σρ((½)
σ/(σ–1) y ), then Figure 3c applies. Both goods are good substitutes and it
is optimal to fully specialize using one technology only; A and E are stable, C is unstable.
FIGURE 3a. Mapping Λ(.) for
σω(0)<σω((½)
σ/(σ–1) y )<1
FIGURE 3b. Mapping Λ(.) for
σω(0)<1<σω((½)
σ/(σ–1) y )
FIGURE 3c. Mapping Λ(.) for
1<σω(0)<σω((½)
σ/(σ–1) y )ITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
6.  Resource price elasticities
In this section, we extend the analysis of Section 4, investigating the response of output,
technology, and resource use on changes in the resource price for the economy with two
competing technologies. We copy the structure of Section 4, comparing the response without ITC
with the response with ITC. Assume that the two technologies use different resources, or use the
same resource but with different share parameters βg. An increase in the resource price will affect
both technologies differently. For convenience, we assume that both technologies use different
resources, and we study an increase in the resource price used by the first technology.
Without technological change, prices adjust only for goods produced with the first technology
 εp1q1= β ; εp2q1 = 0. (53)
From the demand equation (45), where we use the equilibrium assumption of xg=yg, we deduce
(εy1– εy2) = –σ(εp1– εp2). (54)
Substitution of (46) yields:
εy1(1+(y1/y2)
(σ–1)/σ) = –σβεq 1. (55)
Rearranging terms gives for the elasticity of output:
εy1q 1 = –σβ/(1+(y1/y2)
(σ–1)/σ), (56)
and (38) results in the elasticity of resource use:
εe1q 1 = εy1q 1 + εp 1q 1 – 1 = – σβ/(1+(y1/y2)
(σ–1)/σ)–(1–β). (57)
The elasticities calculated in (56) and (57) resemble the one-technology values calculated in (37)
and (38), except for the correction of the fact that, when the first technology has gained a
substantial share, the elasticity of demand decreases.
With ITC, technology ag adjusts, and (53) becomes:
εp1q1= β – ω(y1)εy1q1 ; εp2q1 = – ω(y2)εy2q1. (58)
After adjusting (55) and rearranging, the elasticity of output, (56) is calculated as:




The long-term resource elasticity is now calculated as:
εe1q 1 = (–σβ/(1+(y1/y2)
(σ–1)/σ–σω(y1)–(y1/y2)
(σ–1)/σσω(y2))–(1–β))/(1–ω(y1)). (60)
Comparing (57) with (59), we see that ITC increases the elasticity of output with respect to
resource prices. Yet, similar to the case for the one-technology model, if both technologies are
poor substitutes, or if both technologies have almost constant returns to scale, i.e. σω(y)<<1 for all
y, then the additional effect of ITC on resource reduction is limited. On the other hand, when both
technologies are moderate substitutes or have sufficient increasing returns to scale, say
½<σω(y)<1, for y=((½)
σ/(σ–1) y ), then the denominator in (59) is halved because of ITC. The
additional effect of ITC on output levels exceeds the primary effect of factor and technology
substitution.
Figure 4a portrays the shift in the mapping Λ(.), taking account of endogenous technology
levels, caused by a change in production costs ξ1. The dashed line represents the mapping for
ξ1=ξ2. When the production costs of the first technology increase, d(ξ1/ξ2)>0, output prices for the
first technology increase, given output shares as determined by sy, and demand for the output
good produced by the first technology decreases. The mapping Λ(.) adjusts downwards. The
stable steady state C  shifts to C' where the first technology has a lower share.
ITC has more drastic impact when substitutability and returns to scale produce one dominant
and one minor technology, as presented in Figure 3b, when two stable steady states exist, one in
which the first technology is dominant (D), the other in which the second technology is dominant
(B). In principle, it is possible that the denominator of the right-hand-side of equation (59)
becomes zero, since σω(y1)>1. That is, the price elasticity of resource use with ITC may become
infinite. Figure 4b portrays the shift in the mapping Λ(.) when production costs ξ1 increase for the
first technology. The mapping Λ(.) shifts to the right, the stable steady state D shifts downwards,
and the unstable steady state C shifts upwards. (Indeed, the denominator of the right-hand-side of
equation (59) is negative, since for C, σω(y)>1, y=y1=y2.) When the resource price continues to
increase, at a certain moment, the steady states C and D coincide, making a bifurcation
equilibrium G. A further increase of the tax will set the curve Λ(.) loose of the diagonal, and the
steady states C and D vanish.
We picture the so-called equilibrium surface in Figure 4c (cf. Magill 1977, Fig. 2b). The line
FDGCHBI presents the set of steady states (shares for first sector on y-axis) as a function of theITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
relative production costs for the two technologies, ξ1/ξ2.
10 The segments FDG and HBI represent
stable steady states, these segments are called the stable sub-manifolds. The segment GCH
represents the unstable steady states, called the unstable sub-manifold. The points G and H
represent so-called bifurcation equilibria. The situation with equal production costs is depicted by
the vertical line with ξ1=ξ2. D and B denote the stable steady states, with dominance of the first
and second technology, respectively, C is the unstable steady state in which both technologies
have equal shares. A tax on a resource that is intensively used in the first technology (in the
figure, that is a shift to the right) will shift both stable steady states B and D downwards, towards
a more favorable share for the second technology; the curves BI and DG are downwards sloping.
When, initially, the economy is in equilibrium in D, a continued increase of the tax will lead to a
continuous fall in the share of the first technology until, at point G, the system jumps to the next
stable sub-manifold at point I. At this point G, a small increase in the resource tax induces
technological change that leads to a major change in long-run dynamic behavior. After a jump, the
economy has locked in another stable sub-manifold in which the second technology becomes
dominant. The first technology will not regain its dominant position, even after complete lifting of

















To conclude this section, we continue the numerical assessment of ITC as presented at the
end of Section 4. We follow the suggestion by Weyant and Olavson (1999) and consider a
                                                  
10 In the figure, we use ln(ξ1/ξ2) on the horizontal axis to have symmetry over the axis with ξ1=ξ2.REYER GERLAGH
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carbon-rich energy technology in competition with a carbon-free energy technology; the elasticity
of substitution between both technologies is assumed σ=3.
11 We abstract from changes in the
overall energy demand, and focus on the substitution between the energy sources. Let us consider
a future period, say 2025, in which carbon-rich energy sources capture a stable market share of
90%, whereas the carbon-free energy sources produce the remaining 10%. We maintain the basic
numbers from Section 4. A carbon tax of 25 $/tC increases fossil fuel prices by 25%. Primary
energy sources have a cost share of 50 per cent, β=0.5. We furthermore assume increasing returns
for both energy technologies of 20 per cent, ω=0.2. Results are presented in Table  1. The
elasticity of end-use carbon-rich energy without ITC amounts to –0.28. The elasticity of primary
carbon-rich energy use without ITC is –0.78. These values are comparable with the values for the
one-technology model, see Table  1. The elasticity of end-use energy with ITC is –0.70. The
elasticity of primary energy use with ITC is –1.50. A carbon tax of 25 $/tC decreases fossil fuel
primary energy use by 17.7 %, without ITC, and by 31.4 %, with ITC. In contrast with the one-
technology model, the effect of ITC is rather substantial in the two-technology model.
7.  ITC and climate change
Induced technological change makes pollution control less costly in the long run. In this paper, we
have studied the response of output and resource use to changes in factor costs as caused by e.g.
environmental taxes. We studied two models with endogenous R&D expenditures. In the first
model, there is one technology available for production of a certain good. In the second model,
two technologies compete, that is, two technologies can be used to produce goods that are good
substitutes. For both models, we calculated explicit expressions for the elasticity of output and
resource use, with and without ITC. Based on sensible parameter values, we found that ITC will
not prove a substantial contribution to resource reduction when there is one technology and
demand is inelastic. This configuration applies to the energy savings debate. Our analysis suggests
that ITC has not much potential to improve on the direct factor substitution of capital, labor and
other production factors for energy, for given technology. In this context, our analysis sketches a
pessimistic perspective, suggesting that there are limits to improvements in energy efficiency.
These limits to substitution, away from energy in favor of other factors, can also be understood
                                                  
11 In many applied models, various energy sources are assumed perfect substitutes, σ=∞. We choose a less
extreme value for σ to account for some complementarity between energy sources.ITC UNDER TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
from a physical perspective. They arise because various basic activities  (e.g. heating, cooling,
transportation) require a minimum amount of energy, given by the thermodynamic laws of
physics. Also, while there is scope for sectoral shifts from highly energy intensive activities to
energy extensive activities, ultimately sectoral shifts are limited too.
Yet, our analysis proves more optimistic when there are competing resources, e.g. when we
aim at carbon dioxide emission reductions through a substitution away from carbon-rich energy
sources toward carbon-poor or carbon-free energy sources. In this setting, ITC acts as a powerful
multiplier for the price elasticity of resource use. Moreover, it is possible that multiple balanced
growth paths exist, each with another dominant energy technology. Indeed, if the current energy
system is biased towards fossil-fuel based energy sources, because of spill-over effects, an
alternative (imaginary) energy system in which the carbon-free energy sources have traded in
place with fossil-fuel energy sources can exist. Then, the configuration of multiple steady states
applies to the current energy system and the economy exhibits path dependency. A pessimistic
feature of this configuration is that the current economy is locked-in in fossil-fuel technologies.
Carbon-free technologies will not gain a substantial market share under their own steam. The
optimist feature is that, nonetheless, a carbon tax may render the current fossil-fuel dominance of
the energy system unstable, setting in motion a major transition.
Having said so, it will be a challenge to develop renewable energy sources that are truly good
substitutes for fossil-fuels. Solar, wind and new biomass seem too land intensive to displace fossil
fuels at large scale. Moreover, solar and wind are intermittent, greatly limiting the amount that can
be used to directly produce electricity, while storage of solar and wind energy (e.g. as hydrogen)
remains a very expensive option. There is a need to search for new concentrated sources of
energy, such as nuclear fusion, or geothermal sources from below the earth's mantle, capable of
eventually displacing fossil fuels. The development of these sources naturally is a very long-term
enterprise, and the commencement of such development requires more than a modest increase in
fossil-fuels prices.
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